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We scholars have often been accused of 'perpetuating the very
world we analyze'. If I succeed in achieving even partially what I
attempt in this paper, it should render us l~ss liable to that
accusation. Its goal, however, is modest and certainly much more
modest than that of Marx, who would that one studied philosophy
not merely to understand but to change the world. This paper
studies the world, especially the primal world, for how it might
change our understanding of philosophy, or I11-0re precisely, the
philosophy of religion. The purpose of this paper then is to
examine how the concept of revelation in the philosophy of religion
fares when that concept is exposed to materials drawn from the
primal religions. 1 This task has not hitherto been attempted from
within the philosophy of religion to the best of our knowledge.2
11
The first issue which arises on undertaking such ~n enterprise is that
of the adequacy of the Christian approach to revelation, which is
Huston Smith on 'primal' and 'tribal': 'We shall call [it]. ..primal because it
came first, but alternatively we shall refer to it as tribal because its groupings
were invariably small, or oral because writing was unknown to them.' The
World's Religions, San Francisco, 1991, p. 365. Might they be considered
primal not merely temporally but also for being ontologically, as closer to the
source of things? This might serve as a wholesome corrective to the tendency
to contrast the "primal" with the "axial". See Samuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Religious
Diversity', in Mircea Eliade, (editor in chiet), The Encyclopedia of Religion,
New York, 1987, vol. 12, pp. 313-18; also Charles H. Long, 'Matter and
Spirit; A Reorientation', in Steven Friesen (ed.), Local Knowledge, Ancient
Wisdom: Challenges in Contemporary Spirituality, Honolulu, 1991 p. 14; and
Smith, Ope cit., p. 366..
2 James Hastings (ed.,) Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, New York, 1919
vol. X, pp. 745-49 which stops with Islam; Eliade (editor in chiet), Ope cit.,
pp. 356-62, which stops with Hinduism; John H. Hick, Philosophy of
Religion (Fourth Edition), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1990 which stays
with Christianity and generally excludes primal religions from consideration.
See p. 3.
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more or less taken for granted as normative in the discussion of the
topic in the philosophy of religion.
This current approach in the philosophy of religion towards
revelation distinguishes between two theories of revelation; namely,
the propositional and the non-propositional theories of revelation.
John Hick has pointed out that 'Christian thought contains two very
different understandings of the nature of revelation and, as a result,
two different conceptions of faith (as the human reception of
revelation), of the Bible (as a medium of revelation), and of
theology (as discourse based upon revelation)'.1 These two
positions are then summarized by him as follows:
The view that dominates the medieval period and that is
represented today by more traditional forms of Roman
Catholicism (and also, in a curious meeting of opposites, by
conservative Protestantism) can be called the 'propositional'
understanding of revelation. According to this view, the content
of revelation is a body of truths expressed in statements or
propositions. Revelation is the imparting to people of divinely
authenticated truths. In the words of the older Catholic
En cy c lop e d i a, 'Revelation may be defined as the
communication of some truth by God to a rational creature
through means which are beyond the ordinary course of
nature' .2
This propositional view of revelation has been contested by another,
the nonpropositional view of revelation:
According to this nonpropositional view, the content of
revelation is not a body of truths about God, but God coming
within the orbit of human experience by acting in history. From
this point of view, theological propositions, as such, are not
revealed but represent human attempts to understand the
significance of revelatory events. This noppropositional
conception of revelation is connected with the modem renewed
emphasis upon the personal character of God and the thought
that the divine-human personal relationship consists of
something more than the promulgation and reception of
theological truths. Certain questions at once present themselves.3
1 Hick, op. cit., p. 56.
2 Loc. cit.
3 Ibid., p. 64.
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The Christian concept relies Of} the idea of God's disclosure to
human beings either verbally or historically through a scripture.
Such a view, however, immediately poses a twofold problem from
the perspective of primal religions on their own ground. A
revelation is, by definition, a revelation of truth. However,
religiously sensitive thinkers of the primal religious traditions
remain unconvinced of this very veracity of the Christian revelation
on its own ground. In relation to the propositional view of
revelation they point out that it exists in the form of scripture, as
something written down. But Jesus Christ, around which the
scriptural world revolves, himself 'left no writings'.1 In other words,
the verQal revelation already &tands removed one step from its
primal source, as we have it no\v. Not only did Jesus never write a
word, what was supposed to happen historically about him has failed
to transpire, namely, the Second Coming. It has yet to materialize.2
This is why the priqlal religious thinkers tend to take a sceptical
view of revelation as traditionally conceived, within the philosophy
of religion. Indeed from the point of view of the study of primal
religions~ it is now claimed that i~ is primal religions which shed new
light on the content of Christian revelation. The phenomenon of the
cargo cult acquires special significance in this context. Although the
phenomenon of cargo cults is ~ssociated with Melanesia, parallel
phenomena are clearly discernible in the case of the 'Good
Message' cult of the Iroquois Indians early in the nineteenth
century3 and the Ghost Dance Cult of the Native Americans in the
late nin~teenth century.4 In order to see the implication of this
phenomenon, more generally referred to as revitalization
movements, one must bear in mind that 'In every case the cargo
cult is a broad reflection of the colonial political and cultural
subjugation which an innovative religious cosmology legitimates'S
1 Gerald O'Collins S. 1., 'Jesus', in Eliade (editor in chief) Ope cit., vo!. 8, p. 15.
Not only does nothing written by Jesus survive, the first Christian Gospel was
probably not written until after 66 C.E.
2 See 11 Peter 3:8-10; I Thessalonians 5:1-3 and 4:13-18 (in context); as well as
11 Thessalonians 2:1-12 and Matthew 25:19 and Luke 20:9 (in context). I am
indebted to lan Hendersen for these references. Also see Mircea Eliade (editor in
chief), Ope cit., vo!. 12, p. 348. The deferment of the Second Coming is
repeatedly alluded to, for instance, by Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red, New York,
1973 p. 119 etc. In general primal thinkers remain highly sceptical about the
historical charms associated with the Rorlele, ibid., Chapter 7.
3 Anson D. Shupe, Jr., Six Perspectives on New Religions: A Case Study
Approach, New York, 1981, pp. 85 ff.
4 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
S Ibid., p. 92.
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and that there are two elements common to its numerous
manifestations: 'the "cargo" in the foreigners' ships, and the
natives' own ancestors'. 1 Many cargo cults foresee the apocalyptic
destruction of the whites and the restoration of a new order
characterized by plenty.
One's perception of the early Christian experience is, speaking
as a historian of religion, profoundly altered, if this model is applied
to that experience. The colonial, political and cultural subjugation
of the Hebrews by the Romans, the consequent wish for the 'cargo'
of political supremacy and the intervention of the spirits such as the
Holy Spirit in the matter, the expectation of the Second Coming and
the destruction of non-Christians followed by a reign of plenty,
though not on all fours with the cargo cult model, bears such a
striking resemblance to it that it is hard to put it out of mind and
calls for investigation by scholars more competent in this field. The
study of new religious movements may here open up a strikingly
new perspective for examining the early phase in the history of
Christianity.
Moreover, some of the new religious movements have been rash
enough to make specific prophecies and scholars like Leon
Festinger and others have examined the issue of what happens When
Prophecy Fails.2 In a classic study of a UFO cult the reaction of its
followers to the failure of the predictions to materialize was
analyzed after this failure gave rise to what Festinger calls 'cognitive
dissonance' - the simultaneous presence of two inconsistent
cognitions which is potentially stressful. In this case the options for
handling the situation were clear: either one overlooked the
prediction or abandoned the cult or, notwithstanding an awareness
of the failure, retained membership of the cult. This last course of
action seems highly illogical and yet not only was this course
adopted by many, it was discovered that, those who had a
considerable 'amount of social support at the time of the
disconfirmation... retained their faith (though not without some
effort)', but those who were 'alone when they confronted the fact
that the prophecy had failed invariably abandoned it'.3
These findings could throw new light on how the Christian
Church faced the disconfirmation of the Second Coming. For when
the Second Coming ceased to materialize for centuries the logical
expectation should have been the abandonment of Christianity by
people in large numbers; instead, the Church emerged strengthened
1 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
2 Ibid., p. 136.
3 Ibid., p. 140.
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by the crisis. This is perhaps a development which can be
anticipated by the model under study, for under certain conditions
Festinger and others postulate 'an increase in religious fervour and
belief after an irrefutable disconfirmation of prophecy',1 which
seem to hold in this case. The basic factor to be considered is the
strength of the socially inteqneshed network of believers. Thus the
Christian experience here may again benefit from a conclusion
drawn from the study of some new religious movements in a primal
context, namely,
that religious belief does not depend solely on the logical
consequences of prophecy and real world experience... It is not
unfulfilled prophecy p~r se that irrevocably disillusions
believers, but rather it is the social conditions in which such
disconfirmations are received that determine their ultimate
impact on faith.2
This gives a new meaning to the role of the social gospel aspect of
Christianity, to which Elaine Pagels has drawn fresh attention in the
very formative phase of Christianity itself in her recent work: The
Origin of Satan.3
III
At a secondary level, the way in which the primal religious tradition
actually encountered the Christian revelation was not designed to
enhance their confidence in its truth claims. The other modalities of
revelation - the verbal and the historical - were not such as might
inspire divine confidence in them, when primal peoples encountered
the former as literacy, and the latter as missionary activity or
outright conquest. It is possible that these are secular surrogates of
the Christian concepts but it was through them that the primal
people experienced the Christian presence. However it has been
alleged that literacy was used or perhaps abused by the Christian
community to defraud and exploit nonliterate primal cultures4 and
1 Ibid., p. 138.
2 Ibid., p. 141.
3 New York, 1995.
4 See Constance Classen, 'Literacy as Anticulture: The Andean Experience of the
Written Word', History of Re?igions 30:4 May 1991 pp. 404-21. Although
this article deals with archaic cultures, its conclusions apply pari passu, to the
primal. One can only wonder how 'the negative experience of writing' (p. 413)
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the concept of history was employed in the form of doctrines such
as those of 'progress' or 'manifest destiny' to obscure the
legitimate and even legal claims of the primal people. I In other
words, the historical experience of the primal people with
Christianity seems to cast a cloud of philosophical doubt over its
revelatory modalities.
IV
At even a tertiary level, the propositional and nonpropositional
doctrines of revelation in the philosophy of religion pose
difficulties from a primal point of view. The Christian concept of
revelation, in either case, intimately relies on God's revelation to
human beings either through word (verbally) or deed (historically).
Yet these are not the ways in which God has been typically
experienced in primal religions. Even when these modalities have
appeared, they have assumed different forms. Thus the verbal mode
has taken the form of oral narratives2 and oracles3 and the historical
mode has always possessed dimension.4 In fact, a much more
fundamental issue seems to be at stake from the point of view of the
philosophy of religion. It is a truism that words are also symbolic in
nature, as icons or images are. However, philosophy of religion has
accorded special status to language as a symbol-system and has not
by a people might have coloured their attitude toward 'scripture', especially
Christian scripture.
Dedria, op. cit., p. 82: 'A religion defined according to temporal
considerations is placed continually on the defensive in maintaining its
control over historical events. If, like the Hebrews of the Old Testament,
political, economic, and cultural events can be interpreted as religious events,
the religious time and the secular time can be made to appear to coincide. If,
however, the separation becomes more or less permanent, as in Christianity
and Western concepts of history, then religion becomes a function of political
interpretations as in the Manifest Destiny theories of American history, or it
becomes secularized as an economic determinism as in Communist theories of
history. Either way the religion soon becomes helpless to intervene in the
events of real life, except in a peripheral and oblique manner.' etc.
2 Raymond J. De Mallie and Douglas R. Parks, (eds) Sioux Indian Religion:
Tradition and Innovation, Norman and London, 1987, pp. 57-65 etc. 'A Zuni
Indian once asked an ethnologist who was meticulously noting each word of a
traditional story, "when I tell these stories, do you see it, or do you just write it
down?'" Highwater, Ope cit., p. 68, also see pp. 112 ff.
3 Geoffrey Parrinder, Africa's Three Religions, London, 1969 pp. 60 ff.
4 D. M. Dooling (ed.), The Sons of the Wind, San Francisco, 1984.
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extended the same recognition to objects of art or culture as
distinguished from words. In this sense, for want of a better word,
the philosophy of religion may be described as logocentric.
A philosophy must be so by its very nature. The problem this
poses in the context of primal religions is that while most of the
religions covered by the philosophy of religion express themselves
simultaneously in words and objects - in philosophy and in art the
philosophy of religion, while focusing on the former mode of
expression, is able to do justice to the tradition as a whole. The
primal religions present a challenge to the philosophy of religion in
confronting it primarily with objects instead of words and as these
objects often tend to be grotesque, the philosopher of religion is
inclined to ignore them instead of attempting to tease out the
worldview embodied in them and to put it in words as a valid
philosophy of religion.
This, no doubt, represents a reversal of our normal experience in
which explanation by words precedes or is simultaneous with the
formation of the object. It is because we are aware of the passion
narratives that the image of Christ on the Cross does not appear to
us as an undeciphered object of primitive art. We see the issue
involved in a flash once the image is deprived of the narrative it is
reduced to a primitive meaningless object. The problem which
primal religions present is this - that their philosophical or narrative
thinking itself has often been carried out not through words but
objects. Hence a primal perspective on the philosophy of religion
involves the acceptance, retrieval and incorporation of such
philosophy, originally expressed in objects rather that words, into
the philosophy of religion. This process has commenced:
There has been an enlargement beyond doctrinal emphases that
center religion on a set of beliefs that can be written as a creedal
statement; an enlargement beyond religion conceived
exclusively as an institutional entity with a directive priesthood
or authoritative voice. These aspects are not to be denied, but
that overly narrow construal of religion has been broadened to
include other dimensions, such as aesthetic expressions... 1
A good illustration of this is provided by the 'monstrous feline
crouches' in Columbia, the jaguar-monsters of San Agustin. These
could easily be dismissed as meaningless primitive representations
unless the following clarifying question was asked: 'What, then, do.
1 Lawrence E. Sullivan, 'Dissonant Human Histories and the Vulnerability of
Understanding', in Steven Friesen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 26-27.
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these different types of feline sculptures represent, and how do they
express iconographically one of the major tenets of religious
system?'}
A primal perspective on the philosophy of religion predisposes
one to ask such a question. And it is only after such a question had
been posed that they were found to acquire, upon further
investigation: 'A much wider meaniq.g, in accordance with a broad
underlying system of beliefs related to the shamanistic power quest
and the all-important concept of procreative energy'.2 Without the
philosophical context they appear 'Figures of fantasy and
nightmare' but once their language of objects rather than words is
understood a conclusion, as follows, can be reached:
It is obvious then that the jaguar-monster is not a deity, a divine
being whom people would adore as a god, but rather a general
principle of creation and destruction - a natural life force, so to
speak - himself subject to a higher power. This point is clearly
stated in many aboriginal myths: The jaguar was not alone in the
beginning but was created by a divine being and set into this
world as a great ambivalent force capable of good or evil. It has
to be mastered not only by the shaman but also by each person
for himself, if a moral and social order is to be preserved. The
Jaguar is man, is the male; it stands for all human nature that is
sexually and socially aggressive and predatory, and whose
energy has to be curbed by cultural restrictions to ensure the
survival of society.3
v
But what about a phenomenological rather that a merely
philosophical approach to the concept of revelation? Might not its
more inclusive nature allow for the material from primal religions to
be accommodated within it? Johannes Deninger, for instance, offers
the following five phenomenological criteria of revelation:
1. Origin or author: God, spirits, ancestors, power (mana),
forces. In every case the source of revelation is something
supernatural or numinous.
} Gerardo Reichel-Dolmotoff, San Agustin: A Culture of Columbia,
Charlottesville, 1975, vol. I, p. 108, emphasis added.
2 Ibid., p. 109.
3 Ibid., p. 113.
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2. Instrument or means: sacred signs in nature (the stars,
animals, sacred places, or sacred ~imes); dreams, visions,
ecstasies; finally, words or sacred books.
3. Content or object: the didactic, helping, or punishing
presence, will, being, activity, or commission of the divinity.
4. Recipients or addressees: medicine men, sorcerers,
sacrificing priests, shamans, soothsayers, mediators, prophets
with a commission or information intended for individuals
or groups, for a people or the entire race.
5. Effect and consequence for the recipient: personal
instruction or persuasion, divine mission, service as oracle -
all this through inspiration or, in th~ supreme case, through
incarnation. l
The phenomenologists have cast their net wider than the
philosophers but they too may have failed to reel in the catch. The
catch lies in the expression 'in nature' when the instrument or
means of revelation is discussed. For, from the perspective of primal
religions, nature itself can be the medium of revelation, rather than
something contained in it, such as a sacred place or animal. Yahweh
offered to the Hebrews Israel, which was a piece of nature (land) but
it was the 'effect or consequence for the recipient' (Deninger's
item 2) not the instrument or means' (Deninger's item 5).
Shinto provides a closer parallel wit4 stories of its specific
creation by the kami, as in the picturesque account of an island
being formed through a pejewelled spear, as in Chapter 3 of the
Kojiki:
1 At this time the heavenly deities, all with one command, said
to the two deities IZANAGI-NO-MIKOTO and IZANAMI-
NO MIKOTO: 'Complete and solidify this drifting land!'
2 Giving them the Heavenly Jewelled Spear, they entrusted the
mission to them.
3 Thereupon, the two deities stood on the Heavenly Floating
Bridge and, lowering the jewelled spear, stirred with it. They
1 Johannes Deninger, 'Revelation', in Eliade (editor in chief), Ope cit., vol. 12,
p. 356.
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stirred the brine with a churning-churning sound; and when
they lifted up [the spear] again, the brine dripping down
from the tip of the spear piled up and became an island.
This was the island ONOGORO.l
The process, as described in Chapter 6 refers to the islands being
begotten:
CHAPTER 6
IZANAGI AND IZANAMI GIVE BIRTH TO NUMEROUS
ISLANDS.
1 After they had finished saying this, they were united and
bore as a child [the island] APADI-NO-PO-NO-SA-WAKE-
NO-SIMA.
2 Next they bore the double island of IVO. This island has
one body and four countenances, each with a separate name:
3 Thus, the land of IVO is named EPIME; the land of
SANUKI is named IPI-YORI-PIKO; the land of APA is
named OPO-GE-TUPlME; and the land of TOSA is named
TAKE-YORI-WAKE.
4 Next they bore the triple island of OKI, also named AME-
NO-OSI-KORO-WAKE.
5 Next they bore the island of TUKUSI. This island also has
one body and four countenances, each with a separate
name:2
As Izanami dies she gives birth to numerous deities from her body,
as happens in the Purusasukta of the Rig Veda (X-90).3 After the
two together had brought forth a number of deities, although in this
case they are born not so much from the body as from her bodily
secretions like vomit, urine, etc.4 Similarly, various items grow from
the corpse of the deity OPO-GE-TU-PIME-NO kami, rather than
1 Donald L. Philippi (trans.), Kojiki, Tokyo, 1968, p. 49.
2 Ibid., p. 53.
3 I owe this suggestion to Victor Hori, as also the references from the Kojiki.
4 Phillipi, Ope cit., p. 57.
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emerging from dismembered parts of the body.l Never~heless t~e
parallel with the sacrifice of the purusa does have a teasIng qualIty
to it.
In Chapter 11 Izanagi does the same: he generates a host of
kamis as he ritually cleanses himself, providing an interesting case
of creation not through ritual as such but ritual cleansing:
IZANAGI PURIFIES HIMSELF, GIVING BIRTH TO MANY
DEITIES INCLUDING AMA-TERASU-OPO-MI-KAMI AND
SDSA-NO-WO.
1 Hereupon, IZANAGI-NO-OPO-KAMI said: 'I have been to
a most unpleasant land, a horrible, unclean land. Therefore I
shall purify myself'.
2 Arriving at [the plain] AKAPAKE-PARA by the river-
mouth of TATffiANA in PIMUKA in TUKUSI, he purified
and exorcised himself.
3 When he flung down his stick, there came into existence a
deity named TUKI-TATU-PUNA-TO-NO-KAMI.
4 When he flung down his sash, there came into existence a
deity named MITI-NO-NAGA-TI-PA-NO-KAMI.
5 Next, when he flung down his bag, there came into existence
a deity named TOKI-PAKASI-NO-KAMI.
The parallel with the Australian Aboriginal experience is striking,
wherein the activity of the mythic beings in mythic time (often
called Dreaming) involved the 'process of shaping that world,
making it habitable or humanized - that is, preparing it for the
emergence of a human population'.2 The identification of some
beings with the contour of the land was so close that sometimes 'a
natural feature [was] itself iconographic'.3 However, two differences
between the Japanese original and Australian Aboriginal
experiences also stand out. There is a clearer sense of linear time in
the Japanese accounts and the Japanese quickly acquired scriptures,
in the form of the Kojiki and the Nihongi as soon as writing was
introduced. It is an interesting point for our discussion that
1 Ibid., p. 87.
2 Ronald M. Bemdt, Australian Aboriginal Religion, Leiden, 1974, p. 8.
3 Ibid., p. 18.
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although these texts are canonical in one sense, in another they are
not. They are not like Western scriptures in terms of function and
though they approximate them in terms of form, again they seem to
differ in terms of content. In other words even when religions with
marked primal features become historical religions, this fact leaves
its tell-tale signatures on their sacred texts.
Although special connection to nature distinguishes primal
religion, the nature of the connection can vary. Now what do we
mean by nature? In religions it is primarily the earth, but the
attitudes of the American Indians have a different configuration
than that of the Australian Aborigines, as becomes apparent from
the following account:
When I was a young man I went to a medicine-man for advice
concerning my future. The medicine-man said: 'I have not
much to tell you except to help you understand this earth on
which you live. If a man is to succeed on the hunt or the
warpath, he must not be governed by his inclination, but by an
understanding of the ways of animals and of his natural
surroundings, gained through close observation. The earth is
large, and on it live many animals. The earth is under protection
of something which at times becomes visible to the eye. One
would think this would be at the center of the earth, but its
representations appear everywhere, in large and small forms -
they are the sacred stones. The presence of a sacred stone will
protect you from misfortune'. He then gave me a sacred stone
which he himself had worn. I kept it with me wherever I went
and was helped by it. He also told me where I might find one for
myself. Wakan Tanka tells the sacred stones many things which
may happen to people. The medicine-man told me to observe
my natural surroundings, and after my talk with him I observed
them closely. I watched the changes of the weather, the habits of
animals, and all the things by which I might be guided in the
future, and I stored this knowledge in my mind. l
1 Elaine A. lahner, 'Lakota Genesis: The Oral Tradition', in De Mallie and Parks
(eds), op. cit., p. 55. Also see the speech of Young Chief, A Layuse, who
refused to sign the Treaty of Walla Walla because, he felt, the rest of creation
was not represented in the transaction. Most of this rest of creation is described
in terms of the earth in his speech cited by Deloria, op. cit., p. 95: 'I wonder if
the ground has anything to say? I wonder if the ground is listening to what is
said? I wonder if the ground would come alive and what is on it? Though I hear
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The following account is even more illuminating:
Oral Lyons was the first Onondagan to enter college. When he
returned to his reservation for his first vacation, his uncle
proposed a fishing trip on a lake. Once he had his nephew in the
middle of the lake where he wanted him, he began to interrogate
him. 'Well, Oral,' he said, 'you've been to college; you must be
pretty smart now from all they've been teaching you. Let me
ask you a question. Who are you?' Taken aback by the
question, Oral fumbled for an answer. 'What do you mean, who
am I? Why, I'm your nephew, of course'. His uncle rejected his
answer and repeated his question. Successively, the nephew
ventured that he was Oral Lyons, an Onondagan, a human being,
a man, a young man, all to no avail. When his uncle had reduced
him to silence and he asked to be informed as to who he was, his
uncle said, 'Do you see that bluff over there? Oral, you are that
bluff. And that giant pine on the other shore? Oral, you are that
pine. And this water that supports our boat? You are this water'. 1
Just as the Australian Aboriginal resonated with the early Shinto
religions this one strikes a chord in harmony with the early Hindu
Upanisadic tradition, once set alongside it:
1. 'Bring hither a fig from there'. 'Here it is, sir'. 'Divide it'.
'It is divided, sir'.
'What do you see there?'
'These rather (iva) fine seeds, sir'.
'Of these, please (anga), divide one'.
'It is divided, sir'.
what the ground says. The ground says, It is the Great Spirit that placed me
here. The Great Spirit appointed the roots to feed the Indians OD. The water says
the same thing, The Great Spirit directs me, Feed the Indians well. The grass
says the same thing, Feed the Indians well. The ground, water and grass say, the
Great Spirit has given us our names. We have these names and hold these
names. The ground says, The Great Spirit placed me here to produce all that
grows on me, trees and fruit. The same way the ground says, It was from me man
was made. The Great Spirit, in placing me on earth, desired them to take good
care of the ground and to do each other no harm.'
See Smith, Ope cit., p. 371.
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'What do you see there?'
'Nothing at all, sir'.
2. Then he said to him: 'Verily, my dear, that finest essence
which you do not perceive - verily, my dear, from that finest
essence this great Nyagrodha (sacred fig) tree thus arises.
3. Believe me, my dear,' said he, 'that which is the finest
essence - this whole world has that as its soul. That is reality.
That is Atman (Soul). That art thou, Svetaketu'.l
The accounts from the primal religions and what might be called
the primal dimension of some of the so-called ethnic religions such
as Shinto and Hinduism, also known for their association with
'land' in their own way are more diversified than we expected, but
they are also less divided than they might appear on account of
their common connection with nature. This leads one to ask the
question raised in the next section.
VI
What could this focus on nature possibly contribute to the concept
of revelation in the philosophy of religion? Philosophy of religion
in general employs three key categories in its discussion of
revelation and its philosophical significance: God, Nature, and
History. It sides with God and History over Nature. As one extends
the scope of revelation to include other religions the role of Nature
becomes more difficult to overlook. Even within the Abrahamic
religions Judaism in its commitment to Zion retains a stronger link
with Nature (land) closely tied to history though it be, links which
become global in Christianity and Islam (though without the
'sensory experience of the earth as a whole',2 from outer space)
and eschatological in Zoroastrianism. In Shinto the land is not
offered by God to a people and hence 'sacred', as in Judaism but is
sacred as the land of the Gods itself, rather than per se.3 In
I Robert Emest Hume (trans.), The T/tirteen Principal Upanishads (second
edition), London, 1931, pp. 247-48.
2 Ewert Cousins, "Three Symbols for the Second Axial Period", in Friesen (ed.),
Ope cit., p. 23.
3 The linear concept of time associated with Shinto also needs to be factored
here, see Kitabatake Chikafusa (thirteenth century as cited by Paul S. Maglapus
'Philippine Culture and Modernization' in Robert N. Bellah Ced.) Religion and
Progress in Modem Asia, New York, 1965, p. 40.
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Hinduism, remarkably, in its most standard formulation of the
concept, there is a revelation but without a revealer.
Then from where does it come? The answer is stark and simple:
it is given with the world. For some of the Mimamsa (or
orthodox exegetical) thinkers who have addressed themselves to
this problem, the world is beginningless and the assumption of a
creator is both problematic and unnecessary.
And even if a beginning of the world is assumed, as in later
Hindu thought when it is held that the universe goes through a
pulsating rhythm of origination, existence, and dissolution, it is
also held that at the dawn of a new world the revelation
reappears to the vision of the seers, who once more begin the
transmission.
Revelation, then, comes with the world, and it embodies the laws
which regulate the well-being of both world and man. I
If these religions of revelation present one type of difficulty it
seems to lie in viewing nature as instrumental either as a divine
means or means to the divine or an end divinely secured. On the
other hand, the Taoist, Confucian (and when placed in that
category) Shinto cultures 'are characterized by what J. J. M. de
Groot termed "universism": a holiness, goodness and perfection of
the natural order... ' 2 This comes close to the primal position, as
foreshadowed in the discussion of Shinto but the primal pattern
remains different in that land is holy in and of itself and not
necessarily as part of a universal system - natural or theological.
In primal religions, it seems, the revelation is made by the higher
powers not as a person might speak words but as a potter might
mould clay. The medium of revelation was not verbal language but
material nature.
Once the spiritual vision of the cosmos is recognized, the
[American] Indian attitude toward the land itself becomes
understandable. The land was the gift of the domain of powerful
beings. Certain locations, such as mountains and lakes, served as
I Eliot Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenin, A Source Book of Advaita Vedanta,
Honolulu, 1971, p. 5.
2 Winston L. King, 'Religion' in Eliade (editor in chiet), Ope cit., vol. 12, p.
282.
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especially important points of contact with these spirits or
forces.!
The point to note is that such sacred places are not unknown in
revealed religions, but in primal religions the shaping of the land
itself, like that of words in a scripture, could constitute divine
disclosure. The primal person can no more sell off the land than a
Christian can sell the copyright to the Bible to a press.
Tecumseh and a few other great leaders had the vision of a
whole continent given to all Indians, and epitomized the Indian
feeling for land in the famous words, 'Sell the earth? Why not
sell the air, the clouds, the great sea?' In the realization of the
land belonging to all Indians, do we hear an echo of the tribal
God of Israel being transformed into the God of all human
beings?2
Primal revelation thus takes place through the lineaments of nature
through not a verbal but plastic medium. Now the question arises:
Who is the revealer? In theism God is the revealer. However, in the
same breath as we assert that God is the revealer (and such
revelation occurs somewhere) we also assert that God is everywhere.
If one can grab both the horns of this paradox then one can
perform a Minoan somersault which vaults us to freedom over and
beyond the charging bull in the china-shop of our philosophical
wares, rather like D. H. Lawrence who wrote:
It was a vast old religion, greater than anything we know: more
darkly and nakedly religious. There is no God, no conception of
a God. All is God. But it is not the pantheism we are accustomed
to, which expresses itself as 'God is everywhere, God is in
everything'. In this Indian religion everything is alive, not
supernaturally, but naturally alive.3
Similarly God is eternal, but revelation is given at various points in
time - whether propositional or nonpropositional. Knud Rasmussen
records the following remarks of a shaman from among the
Eskimos who regarded Sila (Hila) as the supreme deity.
1 1. Donald Hughes, as cited in Highwater, op. cit., p. 127.
2 Hick, op. cit., p. 6.
3 Cited in Highwater, op. cit., p. 82. Also see Smith, op. cit., pp. 365-66.
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Yes (I believe in) a power that we call Sila, which is not to be
explained in simple words. A great spirit, supporting the world
and the weather and all life on earth, a spirit so mighty that his
utterance to mankind is not through common words, but by
storm and snow and rain and the fury of the sea; all the forces of
nature that men fear. But he has also another way of utterance,
by sunlight, and the calm of the sea, and little children
innocently at play, themselves understanding nothing. Children
hear a soft and gentle voice, almost like that of a woman. It
comes to them in a mysterious way, but so gently that they are
not afraid, they only hear that some danger threatens. And the
children mention it as it were casually when they come home,
and it is then the business of the angakog (wizard) to take such
measures as shall guard against the peril. When all is well Sila
sends no message to mankind, but withdraws into his own
endless nothingness apart. So he remains as long as men do not
abuse life, but act with reverence towards their daily food.
No one has seen Sila; his place of being is a mystery in that he is
at once among us and unspeakable far away.!
VII
In the context of such a revelation the relationship of religion to life
is another key element, and the point involves considerable subtlety.
In fact it has to do with the definition of religion itself. In primal
religion one does not distinguish the 'religious' from the remainder
or rest of life but this is what the West feels culturally compelled to
do, on account 'of the theistic inheritance from Judaism,
Christianity and Islam. The theistic form of belief in this tradition,
even when downgr.aded culturally',2 as Winston L. King shrewdly
observes, 'is formative in the dichotomous Westem view of religion'
and 'even Western thinkers who recognize their cultural bias find it
hard to escape, because the assumptions of theism permeate the
linguistic structures that shape their thought'.3 These linguistic and
cultural factors lead its subjects to distinguish between creator and
created, sacred and profane, and between the circle of believers and
1 F. M. Bergounioux, O.F.M. and Joseph Goetz, S.J., Prehistoric and Primitive
Religion, London, 1965, pp. 78-79.
2 Winston L. King, loco cit.
3 Ibid.
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those outside it, so that 'religion suggests both separation and a
separative fellowship'.1
Revelation does not seem to have these connotations in primal
religion and in Hinduism. Again Winston L. King, addresses the
issue with great subtlety:
Many practical and conceptual difficulties arise when one
attempts to apply such a dichotomous pattern across the board
to all cultures. In primitive societies, for instance, what the West
calls religious is such an integral part of the total ongoing way
of life that it is never experienced or thought of as something
separable or narrowly distinguishable from the rest of the
pattern. Or if the dichotomy is applied to that multifaceted entity
called Hinduism, it seems that almost everything can be and is
given a religious significance by some sect. Indeed, in a real
sense everything that is divine; existence per se appears to be
sacred. It is only that the ultimately real manifests itself in a
multitude of ways - in the set-apart and the ordinary, in god and
so-called devil, in saint and sinner. The real is apprehended at
many levels in accordance with the individual's capacity.2
The key lies in being able to distinguish the primal case from the
Hindu and being able to trace the hair-line distinguishing them on
the screen. We have tried to distinguish between attitudes to nature
among those religions, like Judaism, Hinduism, Shinto and the
primal religions themselves and are not in danger of getting lost in
the trees by not seeing the wood. For the point to be pressed is not
in distinguishing between attitudes to space but the contrast it
presents to time as a factor in revelation.
This point comes into clear focus when we include the discussion
of African traditional religion which is almost ready to boast, it
seems, that it does not. possess scripture or even provide a kind of
scripture of African religion.3 As for history, 'Since people are so
intimately bound up with their religious life and outlook', writes
John S. Mbiti, 'their history constitutes the history of their
religion' .4 He then articulates how seamless this bond between
religion and life is.
1 Ibid., p. 283.
2 Ibid., p. 282.
3 Parrinder, op. cit., p. 21.
4 John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, 1969, p. 5.
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Because traditional religions permeate all the departments of life,
there is no formal distinction between the sacred and the secular,
between the religious and non-religious, between the spiritual and
the material areas of life. Wherever the African is, there is his
religion: he carries it to the fields where he is sowing seeds or
harvesting a new crop; he takes it with him to the beer party or to
attend a funeral ceremony; and if he is educated, he takes religion
with him to the examination room at school or in the university; if
he is a politician he takes it to the house of parliament. Although
many African languages do not have a word for religion as such, it
nevertheless accompanies the individual from long before his birth
to long after his physical death. Through modern change these
traditional religions cannot remain intact, but they are by no means
extinct. In times of crisis they often come to the surface, or people
revert to them in secret.
Traditional religions are not primarily for the individual, but for
his community of which he is part. Chapters of African religions are
written everywhere in the life of the community, and in traditional
society there are no irreligious people. To be human is to belong to
the whole community, and to do so involves participating in the
beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and festivals of that community. A
person cannot detach himself from the religion of his group, for to
do so is to be severed from his roots, his foundation, his context of
security, his kinships and the entire group of those who make him
aware of his own existence. To be without one of these corporate
elements of life is to be out of the whole picture. Therefore, to be
without religion amounts to a selfexcommunication from the entire
life of society, and African peoples do not know how to exist
without religion. l
Vine Deloria, Jr. carries the point further to its logical conclusion
in differentiating between the two as fundamental modalities of
revelation: temporal and spatial. He then sees a series of points
flowing syllogistically, as it were, from the original premise.
Temporal revelation, he tends to argue, devalues experience.2
So too with one of the related concepts of monotheism, that of
revelation.3 In traditional terms a revelation occurs at a point in
1 Ibid., p. 2.
2 Many Hindu scholars note these two aspects of Christianity but do not make
the connection he forges, see S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life, New·
Delhi, 1993 (first published 1927), pp. 37, 43-44.
3 This relationship between monotheism and revelation is not one of necessity
in Hindu thought.
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time, and succeeding generations are more dependent on their
understanding of the original revelation than upon their
immediate experience of deity. Almost all of the world religions
are partially dependent on a revelation at some point in history.
Contemporary people are more dependent on the validity of the
original revelation of their religion in an educational sense than
they are on their own immediate experience in a qualitative
sense. For many religions this dependence means that belief
replaces experience, and proofs of a logical nature are more
relevant than additional revelations.}
Temporal revelation, according to Vine Deloria, Jr. not only
places emphasis on faith (because it is a past event) rather than
experience but it also changes with time, is individualistic in nature
and (proselytizingly) universalistic by implication.
Revelations must somehow be phrased in the cultural beliefs,
languages, and worldviews of the time in which they occurred.
As times change and cultures become more sophisticated,
sciences come to present a broader view of the universe, and
languages become infused with foreign words and concepts, and
the original revelation also takes on a different aspect.
Revelation has generally been considered as a specific body of
truth related to a particular individual at a specific time. This
glimpse into the eternal, as it were, is too often taken as
universally valid for all times and places. If the universal nature
of religions has not been the subject of debate, it should be our
immediate concern.2
There are also other consequences, which flow as well, according to
Vine Deloria, Jr. if a spatial rather than a temporal dimension is
associated with revelation. He goes on to say:
In shifting from temporal concepts to spatial terms, we find that
a revelation is not so much the period of time in which it occurs
as the place it may occur. Revelation becomes a particular
experience at a particular place, no universal truth emerging but
an awareness arising that certain places have a qualitative
holiness over and above other places. The universality of truth
then becomes the relevance of the experience for a community
1 Deloria, Ope cit., p. 80.
2 Ibid. p. 56.
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of people, not its continual adjustment to evolving scientific and
philosophical conceptions of the universe.!
However, space is in time only. That is to say, even the spatial
expressions of revelation are subject to time. Thus if in an early
eolithic period the sky is the supreme divinity; in the paleolithic the
master of animals and in the neolithic phase of the association of
the productivity of the earth with fertility, the divinities took the
form of a pair - the earth and the sky.2 Such differentiation is
identifiable even in the case of the Sky Gods themselves. Joseph
Goetz has proposed the following:
1. 'Among the hunters, properly speaking... it is difficult to
make out any idea of God';3
2. Among 'food gathering and pastoral societies'4 one finds a
Sky God who is 'active and intervening in man's life'.5
3. Among planter-agriculturist groups one finds 'an inactive,
distant God'6 so much so that in 'the myths themselves
describe, as in Peruvian tradition, how the first men were
destroyed because they could invoke no God but the Father
in the Sky'.7 This corresponds well with the changing
concepts of Yahweh in the context of the history of the
Hebrews.8
Structurally then there are synesthetic similarities between temporal
and spatial dimensions and what began to diverge also seems to start
to converge. Could it be that the medium is not the message; it is the
same message in different media? And what is the message?
1 See Charles Long, 'Religion, Primitive', in Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago,
1966, vol. 19, pp. 110-11.
2 See Charles Long, 'Religion, Primitive', in Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago,
1966, vol. 19, pp. 110-11.
3 F. M. Bergounioux O. F. M. and Joseph Goetz S. 1., Ope cit. p. 86.
4 Ibid., p. 88.
5 Ibid., p. 86.
6 Loc. cit.
7 Ibid., p. 88.
8 Hick, Ope cit., p. 6.
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VIII
Thus the primal contribution to the philosophy of religion on the
point of revelation is to reveal it as a particular kind of hierophany,
a manifestation of the sacred. It is this recognition or revelation as a
subcategory of hierophany in terms of primal religion - which, once
made obvious, becomes obvious but remains obscured so long as
the relation is not established. The movement in this direction is
clear in the work of Mircea Eliade, although if it has been made as
emphatically as it is being made now, then it escaped my attention.
The clues Eliade provides consist of such statements as 'we cannot
be sure that there is anything object, movement, psychological
function, being or even a game - that has not at some time in human
history been somewhere transformed into a hierophany' ~l Eliade
goes on to cite a number of items, including, 'to the essential words
of the language'2 (hence mantras?) but he still does not mention
scriptural revelation. He almost hints that he treats 'written texts' as
a sphere from which the 'scraps of evidence' of hierophany may be
drawn, rather that considering the text itself as a sphere of
hierophany. However a breakthrough comes with this comment:
One might even say that all hierophanies are simple
prefigurations of the miracle of Incarnation, that every
hierophany is an abortive attempt to reveal the mystery of the
coming together of God and man.3
He goes on to say:
Ockham, for instance, even went so far as to write: 'Est articulus
fidei quod Deus assumpsit naturam humanam. Non includit
contradictionem, Deus assumere naturam assinam. Pari ratione
potest assumere lapidum aut lignum'. It does not, therefore,
seem absurd in the least to study the nature of primitive
hierophanies in the light of Christian theology: God is free to
manifest himself under any form - even that of stone or wood.
Leaving out for a moment the word 'God', this may be
translated: the sacred may be seen under any sort of form, even
the most alien. In fact, what is paradoxical, what is beyond our
understanding, is not that the sacred can be manifested in stones
1 Eliade, Ope cit., p. 11.
2 Ibid., p. 12.
3 Ibid., p. 29.
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or in trees, but that it can be manifested at all, that it can thus
become limited and relative. 1
And then he concludes with this footnote:
One could attempt to vindicate the hierophanies which preceded
the miracle of the Incarnation in the light of Christian teaching
by showing their importanc~ as a series of prefigurations of that
Incarnation. Consequently, far from thinking of pagan religious
ways (fetishes, idols and such) as false and degenerate stages in
the religious feeling of mankind fallen in sin, now may see them
as desperate attempts to prefigure the mystery of the
Incarnation. The whole religious life of mankind - expressed in
the dialectic of hierophanies - would, from this standpoint, be
simply a waiting for Christ.2
The way is thus paved for the unhesitating acknowledgement of
Christian revelation as a hierophany:
... Hierophanic moments of time are not restricted to cosmic
rhythms of nature or biology. In the Judeo-Christian tradition,
for example, human history is transfigured into a theophany.
The manifestation of God ill time guarantees the religious value
of Christian images and symbols such as the cross, the holy
mountain of Calvary, and the cosmic tree.3
The following points emerge from viewing the concept of
revelation through the prism of primal religions:
1. Hierophany is the broadest general category. Hierophany is
a mode of revelation just as theophany and kratophany are
modes of hierophany.
2. Nonpropositional revelation fits the category of hierophany
better than that of propositional revelation, as per the current
usages of the term.
1 Ibid., p. 29-30.
2 Ibid., p. 31, note 1. Interestingly the discussion by Wilhelm Dupre (Relig ion
in Primitive Cultures: A Study in Ethnophilosophy, the Hague, 1975 pp. 313-
14) oscillates between protorevelation and the claim that 'consciousness is in
its very essence revelatory'. (p.314).
3 Mircea Eliade and Lawrence E. Sullivan, in Eliade (editor in chief), Ope cit., val.
6, p. 316.
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3. Revelation may be categorized as propositional, historical
or symbolic to accommodate all major modes of its
manifestation in the religions of the world within it.
4. The incamatory description of Jesus Christ as fully human
and divine is an attempt to rationalize the dialectical
structure of the sacred by assimilation, whereas
distinguishing the metaphysical and moral attributes of God
in the same context and regarding the Incarnation as an
embodiment of the latter represents a partial reversal of the
process.
5. Hierophanies can also be verbal but an oracle is not a
scripture. Nevertheless, a comprehensive hierophany of
natural components may be comparable to one of verbal
components.
For the Aboriginal peoples of Australia, for example, the
landscape of their native lands is alive. Its smallest details are
charged with meanings revealed in myth. Because the sacred
first appeared in those places (to guarantee a food supply and to
teach humans how to feed themselves), they became an
inexhaustible source of power and sacrality. Humans can return
to these places in each generation, to commune with the power
that has revealed itself here. In fact, the Aboriginal peoples
express a religious need to remain in direct contact with those
sites that are hierophanic. 1
In this respect the Qur'an may be treated as a verbal hierophany. Its
finality as a revelation, however, breaks the cycle of comparison for
hierophanies 'capable of repeating themselves' unless the repeated
readings of a text provide a parallel.
6. The media of hierophany can change, just like the language
of a scripture.
IX
To conclude: In a recent book Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith
asks the provocative question crucial to so many world religions,
1 Eliade and Sullivan, Ope cit., p. 315.
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namely, what is scripture? And in a step which highlights the
significance of the issue we are discussing even makes that
provocative question the title of the book itself. Now we know how
the question will be answered from the standpoint of the primal
perspective on the philosophy of religion: it is a hierophany, a
revelation of the sacred. I feel tempted to add: all scriptures are
hierophanies but not all hierophanies are scriptures but I shall do
my best to resist it.
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